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Abstract—Belief and vulnerability have been proposed recently
to quantify information flow in security systems. Both concepts
stand as alternatives to the traditional approaches founded on
Shannon entropy and mutual information, which were shown to
provide inadequate security guarantees. In this paper we unify
the two concepts in one model so as to cope with (potentially
inaccurate) attackers’ extra knowledge. To this end we propose
a new metric based on vulnerability that takes into account the
adversary’s beliefs.
Index Terms—Security; information hiding, information flow;
quantitative and probabilistic models; uncertainty; accuracy;
I. Introduction
Protecting sensitive and confidential data is becoming in-
creasingly important in many fields of human activities, such
as electronic communication, auction, payment and voting.
Many protocols for protecting confidential information have
been proposed in the literature. In recent years the frame-
works for reasoning, designing, and verifying these protocols
have considered probabilistic aspects and techniques for two
reasons. First, the data to be protected often range in domains
naturally subject to statistical considerations. Second and more
important, the protocols often use randomised primitives to
obfuscate the link between the information to be protected and
the observable outcomes. This is the case, e.g., of the DCNets
[8], Crowds [30], Onion Routing [37], and Freenet [13].
From the formal point of view, the degree of protection is the
converse of the leakage, i.e. the amount of information about
the secrets that can be deduced from the observables. Early ap-
proaches to information hiding in literature were the so-called
possibilistic approaches, in which the probabilistic aspects
were abstracted away and replaced by non-determinism. Some
examples of these approaches are those based on epistemic
logic [19], [36], on function views [21], and on process calculi
[31], [32]. Recently, however, it has been recognised that the
possibilistic view is too coarse, in that it tends to consider
as equivalent systems which have very different degrees of
protection.
The probabilistic approaches are therefore becoming in-
creasingly more popular. At the beginning they were inves-
tigated mainly at their strongest form of protection, namely
to express the property that the observables reveal no (quan-
titative) information about the secrets (strong anonymity, no
interference) [2], [8], [19]. More recently, weaker notions of
protection have been considered, due to the fact that such
strong properties are almost never achievable in practice.
Still in the probabilistic framework, Rubin and Reiter have
proposed the concepts of possible innocence and of probable
innocence [30] as weak notions of anonymity protection (see
also [4] for a generalisation of the latter). These are, however,
still true-or-false properties. The need to express in a quanti-
tative way the degree of protection has then lead naturally to
explore suitable notions within the well-established fields of
Information Theory and of Statistics.
Concepts from Information Theory [15] have indeed re-
vealed quite useful in this domain. In particular, the notion
of noisy channel has been used to model protocols for
information-hiding, and the flow of information in programs.
The idea is that the input s ∈ S of the channel represents the
information to be kept secret, and the output o ∈ O represents
the observable. The noise of the channel is generated by the
efforts of the protocol to hide the link between the secrets and
the observable, usually by means of randomised mechanisms.
Consequently, an input smay generate several different outputs
o, according to a conditional probability distribution p(o | s).
These probabilities constitute the channel matrix C. Similarly,
for each output there may be several different correspond-
ing inputs, according to the converse conditional probability
p(s | o) which is linked to the above by the Bayes law:
p(s | o) = p(o | s) p(s)/p(o). The probability p(s) is the a priori
probability of s, while p(s | o) is the a posteriori probability
of s, after we know that the output is o. These probability
distributions determine the entropy and the conditional entropy
of the input, respectively. They represent the uncertainty about
the input, before and after observing the output. The difference
between entropy and conditional entropy is called the mutual
information and expresses how much information is carried
by the channel, i.e. how much uncertainty about the input
we lose by observing the output (i.e., equivalently, how much
information about the input we gain by observing the output).
Even though several notions of entropy have been proposed
in Information Theory, Shannon’s is by far the most famous
of them, due to its relation with the channel’s rate, i.e., the
speed by which information can be transmitted accurately on
a channel. Consequently, there have been various attempts to
define the degree of protection by using concepts based on
Shannon entropy, notably mutual information [10], [23], [24],
[38] and the related notion of capacity, which is the supremum
of the mutual information over all possible input distributions,
and which therefore represents the worst case from the point
of view of security [5], [27], [28].
A refinement of the above approaches came from the ideas
of integrating the notions of extra knowledge and belief [14],
[18]. The idea is that the gain obtained by looking at the
output should be relative to the possible initial knowledge or
belief that an attacker may have about the secret. For instance,
assume that in a parliament composed by m Labourists and
n Conservatives, m members voted against a proposal to
remove minimum wages. Without any additional knowledge
it is reasonable to believe that all Labourists voted against.
If however we came to know that exactly one Conservative
voted against, then it is more reasonable to believe that the
most liberally-inclined Conservative voted against, and the
least liberally-inclined Labourist voted in favour. In this case,
the a posteriori belief is likely to be much more accurate than
the a priori one, and the gain obtained using the knowledge
about MPs’ relative positioning on the left-to-right scale is
much larger than the one computed as difference of entropies.
Consequently, [14] proposes to define the protection of a
system in terms of the difference (expressed in terms of
Kullback-Leibler divergence) between the accuracy of the a
posteriori belief and the accuracy of the a priori one.
In recent work, however, Smith has shown that the concepts
based on Shannon entropy are not very suitable for modelling
the information leakage in the typical scenario of protocol
attacks, where the adversary attempts to guess the value of
the secret in one single try [33]. He gave an example of two
programs whose Shannon’s mutual information is about the
same, yet the probability of making the right guess after having
observed the output is much higher in one program than in the
other. In a subsequent paper [34], Smith has proposed to define
the leakage in terms of a notion of mutual information based
on Re´nyi min-entropy.
Recently in [20] the authors extended the vulnerability
model of [34] in the context of the Crowds protocol for anony-
mous message posting to encompass the frequent situation
where attackers have extra knowledge. They pointed out that
in Crowds the adversary indeed has extra information (viz.,
the target servers) and assumed that she knows the correlation
between that and the secret (viz., the users’ preferences for
servers). They proved that in such scenarios anonymity is more
difficult to achieve.
In our opinion, a fundamental issue remains wide open:
the need to measure and account for the accuracy of the
adversary extra knowledge. Indeed, [20] assumes that the
adversary’s extra information is accurate, and this assumption
is generally not warranted. Inaccuracy can indeed arise, e.g.
from people giving deliberately wrong information, or simply
from outdated data. As already noticed in [14] there is no
reason in general to assume that the probability distributions
the attacker uses are correct, and therefore they must be treated
as beliefs.
This paper tries to fill this gap by generalising the model on
Re´nyi min-entropy to cope with the presence of the attacker’s
beliefs. To this end we propose a new metric based on the
concept of vulnerability that takes into account the adversary’s
beliefs. The idea is that the attacker does not know the actual
probability distributions (i.e., the a priori distribution of the
protocol’s hidden input and its correlation with the extra
information), and is assuming them. The belief-vulnerability
is then the expected probability of guessing the value of the
hidden input in one try given the adversary’s belief. Informally,
the adversary chooses the value of the secret input which
has the maximum a posteriori probability according to her
belief. Then the vulnerability of the secret input is expressed in
terms of the actual a posteriori probabilities of the adversary’s
possible choices. We show the strength of our definitions
both in terms of their theoretical properties and their utility
by applying them to various threat scenarios and comparing
the results to the previous approaches. Among its several
advantages, our model allows to identify the levels of accuracy
for the adversary’s beliefs which are compatible with the
security of a given program or protocol.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in §II we
fix some basic notations and recall some fundamental notions
of Information Theory; in §III we briefly revise previous
approaches to quantitative information follow; §IV delivers our
core technical contribution by extending the model on Re´nyi
min entropy to the case of attacker’s beliefs and investigating
its theoretical properties; in §V we apply our approach to vari-
ous threat scenarios and compare it to the previous approaches
whilst §VI contains our concluding remarks.
II. Preliminaries
In this section we briefly revise the elements of Information
Theory which underpin the work in this paper, and illustrate
our conceptual framework.
A. Some notions of information theory
Being in a purely probabilistic setting gives us the abil-
ity to use tools from information theory to reason about
the uncertainty of a random variable and the inaccuracy of
assuming a distribution for a random variable. In particular
we are interested to the following notions: entropy, mutual
information, relative entropy and min-entropy. We refer the
reader to [16], [26] for more details.
We use capital letters X, Y to denote discrete random vari-
ables and the corresponding small letters x, y and calligraphic
letters X, Y for their values and set of values respectively. We
denote by p(x), p(y) the probability of x and y respectively
and by p(x, y) their joint probability.
Let X,Y be random variables. The (Shannon) entropy H(X)
of X is defined as
H(X) = −
∑
x∈X
p(x) log p(x). (1)
The entropy measures the uncertainty of a random variable.
It takes its maximum value log |X| when X is uniformally
distributed and its minimum value 0 when X is a constant. We
take the logarithm with a base 2 and thus measure entropy in
bits. The conditional entropy
H(X|Y) = −
∑
y∈Y
p(y)
∑
x∈X
p(x|y) log p(x|y) (2)
measures the amount of uncertainty of X when Y is known.
It can be shown that 0 ≤ H(X|Y) ≤ H(X) with the leftmost
equality holding when Y completely determines the value of
X and the rightmost one when Y reveals no information about
X, i.e., X and Y are independent random variables.
Comparing H(X) and H(X|Y) give us the notion of mutual
information, denoted I(X;Y) and defined by
I(X;Y) = H(X) − H(X|Y). (3)
It is non-negative, symmetric and bounded by H(X). In other
words 0 ≤ I(X;Y) = I(Y; X) ≤ H(X).
The relative entropy or Kullback-Leibler distance between
two probability distribution p and q on the same set X, denoted
D(p ‖ q), is defined as
D(p ‖ q) =
∑
x∈X
p(x) log
p(x)
q(x)
. (4)
It is non-negative (but not symmetric) and it is 0 if and only
if p = q. The relative entropy measures the inaccuracy or
information divergence of assuming that the distribution is q
when the true distribution is p.
The guessing entropy G(X) is the expected number of tries
required to guess the value of X optimally. The optimal
strategy is to guess the values of X in decreasing order of
probability. Thus if we assume that X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} and
xi’s are arranged in decreasing order of probabilities, i.e.,
p(x1) ≥ p(x2) ≥ · · · ≥ q(xn), then
G(X) =
∑
1≤i≤n
ip(xi). (5)
The min-entropy H∞(X) of a random variable is given by
H∞(X) = − logmax
x∈X
p(x) (6)
and measures the difficulty for an attacker to correctly guess
the value of X in one try (obviously using the optimal strategy
above). It can be shown that H∞(X) ≤ H(X) with equality
when X is uniformly distributed. In general, H(X) can be
arbitrary higher than H∞(X), since it can be arbitrary high
even if X assumes a given value with probability close to 1.
B. Framework
In this paper we consider a framework similar to the
probabilistic approaches to anonymity and information flow
used e.g. in [6], [19], [25], and [34]. We restrict ourselves to
total protocols and programs with one high level input A, a
random variable over a finite set A, and one low level output
(observable) O, a random variable over a finite set O. We
represent a protocol/program by the matrix of the conditional
probabilities p(o j | ai), where p(o j | ai) is the probability that
the low output is o j given that the high input is ai. An
adversary or eavesdropper can see the output of a protocol,
but not its input, and she is interested in deriving the value of
the input from the observed output in one single try.
In this paper we shall assume that the high input is gener-
ated according to an a priori probabilistic distribution pρ(ai)
unknown to the adversary, as explained in the introduction.
We also denote by pβ(ai) the adversary’s assumed a priori
distribution of A. Furthermore, we assume that the attacker
has access to the value of a random variable B distributed over
B which summarises the additional knowledge (information)
about A she has independently of the behaviour of the protocol.
The matrix of the conditional probabilities pρ(bk | ai) (resp.
pβ(bk | ai)) expresses the real (resp. the adversary’s assumed)
correlation between the hidden input and the additional ob-
servables B. An adversary’s belief then consists of the pair
pβ(ai), pβ(bk | ai) of her assumed probabilities.
When | B | = 1 and the a priori distribution is publicly-
known, i.e., pρ(ai) = pβ(ai), the adversary’s additional infor-
mation about A is trivial and cannot help to determine the
value of A. For example, knowing the length of a password
in a fixed-length password system gives no advantage, as all
passwords have the same length. Trivial information allow us
to model the absence of additional information, and to see the
standard framework in the literature as an instance of ours.
Example 1: Let A be a random variable with a publicly-
known uniform a priori distribution over A = {0, 1, 2, 3}.
Assume that the adversary’s additional observable is the parity
of A, i.e. B = {0, 1}, with the following deterministic belief’s
correlation pβ(bk | ai) = p(ai mod 2 = bk). In other words, the
adversary believes that her additional information accurately
reflects that the value of A is an even number if B = 0 and
odd otherwise.
Now suppose that A is the high input of the deterministic
program C1 below, whose low output is
O =
{
1 if a ∈ {0, 1}
2 otherwise.
PROG C1:
BEGIN
O := ⌊ log(A + 2) ⌋
END
In the case of wrong belief, i.e., when the attacker believes
that the value of A is even (resp. odd) when it actually is
odd (resp. even), her low observation of PROG C1 does not
allow her to correct her belief. Indeed, both observations can
be induced by any number.
Now suppose that A is the high input of the probabilistic
program C2 below, with low output O ∈ {−1, 0, 2} and
conditional probabilistic matrix as in Table I.
PROG C2:
BEGIN
R ‘sampled from {0, 2} with p(0) = λ and p(2) = 1 − λ’;
If A = R
Then O := A
p(o | a) o0 o1 o2
a0 1 − λ λ 0
a1 1 0 0
a2 λ 0 1 − λ
a3 1 0 0
TABLE I
Conditional probabilistic matrix of PROG C2
Else O := −1
END
Contrary to the PROG C1, the low output of PROG C2 may
allow the adversary to correct her wrong belief. In particular if
B = 1 and O is either 0 or 2 then the adversary knows that her
belief is wrong. But the observation O = −1 cannot help her
correct her wrong belief, as it is compatible with both beliefs.
III. Uncertainty vs accuracy
This section reviews the existing definitions for quantifying
information leakage. We begin by quantitative approaches
to information flow based on Shannon entropy and mutual
information, and recall why they fail to give good security
guarantees. We then present an alternative approach based
on the adversary’s beliefs proposed by Clarkson, Myers and
Schneider [14]. We conclude the section by presenting a
more recent alternative approach based on the concept of
vulnerability introduced by Smith [34].
A. Shannon entropy approach
There seems to be a general consensus in the literature for
using Shannon entropy to measure uncertainty and mutual
information to quantify information leakage [6], [9], [11],
[12], [22]. We remind the reader that these approaches aim at
quantifying information flow as a reduction of the adversary
uncertainty about the high input and take no account of the
adversary’s initial knowledge. Shannon entropy H(A) as a
measure of the uncertainty of A seems adequate to express the
adversary’s initial uncertainty about A. Similarly, as the con-
ditional entropy H(A |O) measures the amount of uncertainty
of A when O is known, it seems appropriate to express the
adversary’s remaining uncertainty. We thus have the following
definitions.
• initial uncertainty (IU): H(A)
• remaining uncertainty (RU): H(A |O)
• information leakage (IL): IU−RU = H(A)−H(A |O) =
I(A;O)
Nevertheless, recent work by Smith [34] suggests that these
notions do not support security guarantees satisfactorily. In
particular the remaining uncertainty is generally of little value
in characterising the real threat that the adversary could guess
the value of A given her low observations. Smith uses the
following example to prove that.
Example 2: Consider the following programs C3 and C4,
where A is a uniformly distributed 8k-bit integer, k ≥ 2, &
denotes bitwise ‘AND’, and 07k−11k+1 a binary constant.
PROG C3:
BEGIN
If A mod 8 = 0
Then O := A
Else O := 1
END
PROG C4:
BEGIN
O := A & 07k−11k+1
END
PROG C3 reveals completely the high input when A is a
multiple of 8 while it reveals nothing about A otherwise
(except of course the very fact that it is not a multiple of
8). On the contrary, PROG C4 reveals always and only the last
k + 1 bits of A.
According to the consensus definitions, we have IU = 8k,
RU = 7k−0.169 and IL = k+0.169 for PROG C3, and IU = 8k,
RU = 7k − 1 and IL = k + 1 for PROG C4 (the reader is
referred to [34] for the detailed calculations). So, under such
definitions, PROG C4 appears actually worse than PROG C3, as
7k−1 < 7k−0.169, even though intuitively C3 leaves A highly
vulnerable to being guessed (e.g., when it is a multiple of 8)
while C4 does not, at least for large k.
B. Belief approach
Recently Clarkson et al. [14] showed that the Shannon
entropy approach is inadequate for measuring information flow
when the adversary makes assumptions about the high-level
secret and such assumptions might be incorrect. Based on
the conviction that it is unavoidable that the attacker makes
such (potentially inaccurate) assumptions, they proposed a
new metric. They formalised the idea of an adversary’s belief
simply as a distribution of A assumed by the adversary:
information flow is then expressed as an increase of the
accuracy of such belief. The initial accuracy is the Kullback-
Leibler distance between the adversary’s initial belief and the
actual distribution of A; similarly the remaining accuracy is
the Kullback-Leibler distance between the Bayesian-updated
belief of the adversary after her low observation, and the actual
distribution of A.
However, as noticed by Smith [34], when the adversary’s
belief coincides with the a priori distribution of A, then
the belief approach reduces again to the inadequate standard
approach illustrated above.
C. Vulnerability approach
Having observed that both the consensus and the belief
approaches fail in general to give good security guarantees,
Smith [34] proposes a new metric for quantitative information
flow based on the notions of vulnerability and min-entropy.
We briefly revise these concepts here.
The vulnerability of a random variable A is the worse-
case probability that an adversary could guess the value of
A correctly in one try. The vulnerability of A, denoted V(A),
is thus formally defined as follows.
Definition 1: V(A) = maxa∈A p(a).
The conditional vulnerability of a A given O measures the
expected probability of guessing A in one try given O. It is
denoted V(A |O) and defined as follows.
Definition 2: V(A |O) =
∑
o∈O p(o)V(A | o), where V(A | o)
is maxa∈A p(a | o).
The initial uncertainty about A is then defined as the
negative logarithm of V(A), which turnouts to be the min-
entropy of the random variable A – cf. (6) above. And the
remaining uncertainty about A after observing O is defined as
the min-entropy of A given O. Thus we have the following
vulnerability-based definitions:
• IU : H∞(A) = − logV(A)
• RU : H∞(A |O) = − logV(A |O)
• IL : IU − RU = H∞(A) − H∞(A |O)
Now on the security guarantees of the vulnerability-based
approach. By applying these definitions to the programs of
Example 2, we have IU = 8k, RU = 8k − 3 and IL = 3
for PROG C3, and IU = 8k, RU = 7k − 1 and IL = k + 1
for PROG C4. While these quantities remain the same as in
the consensus approach for PROG C4, the new metric hugely
increases the leakage ascribed to PROG C3 reflecting the fact
that the low observations of PROG C3 leave the high input very
vulnerable to being guessed.
A related line of research has explored methods of statistical
inference, in particular those from the hypothesis testing
framework. The idea is that the adversary’s best guess is that
the true input is the one which has the maximum a posteriori
probability (MAP rule) and that, therefore, the a posteriori
vulnerability of the system is the complement of the Bayes
Risk, which is the average probability of making the wrong
guess when using the MAP rule [7]. This is always at least
as high as the a priori vulnerability, which is the probability
of making the right guess just based on the knowledge of the
input distribution. It turns out that Smith’s notion of leakage
actually corresponds to the ratio between the a posteriori and
the a priori vulnerabilities [3], [34].
Concerning the efficient computation of the channel matrix
and the leakage, the only work we are aware of is [1], in
which the authors propose various automatic techniques. One
of these is able to generate counterexamples, namely points on
the execution where the channel exhibits an excessive amount
of leakage. This method is therefore also useful to fix unsound
protocols.
IV. Unifying Belief and Vulnerability
We now propose an alternative approach based on the
vulnerability concept that takes into account the adversary’s
belief.
A. Belief-vulnerability
Let B be the adversary’s additional information about a
random high level variable A. Then the belief-vulnerability of
A is the expected probability of guessing A in one try given the
adversary’s belief. Given an additional information B = b, the
adversary will choose a value having the maximal a posteriori
probability according to her belief, that is a value a′ ∈ Γb,
where Γb = argmaxa∈A pβ(a | b). The vulnerability of A given
b is then the real probability that the adversary’s choice is
correct given b, that is the a posteriori probability pρ(a
′ | b).
As there might be many values of A with the maximal belief
a posteriori probability, the attacker will pick uniformly at
random one element in Γb. Hence we have the following
definition.
Definition 3: Let A be a random variable and B the adver-
sary’s extra knowledge about A. Then the belief-vulnerability
of A, denoted V(A : B), is defined as
V(A : B) =
∑
b∈B
pρ(b)V(A : b) (7)
where V(A : b) = 1
|Γb |
∑
a′∈Γb
pρ(a
′ | b).
Next, we show how to compute V(A : B) from the given
probabilities.
V(A : B) =
∑
b∈B
pρ(b)V(A : b)
=
∑
b∈B
pρ(b)
( 1
|Γb|
∑
a∈Γb
pρ(a | b)
)
=
∑
b∈B
1
|Γb|
∑
a∈Γb
pρ(a | b)pρ(b)
(by Bayes theorem)
=
∑
b∈B
1
|Γb|
∑
a∈Γb
pρ(b | a)pρ(a).
Thus the belief-vulnerability can be easily computed as fol-
lows.
Proposition 1: Let A be a random variable and B the
adversary’s extra knowledge about A. Then
V(A : B) =
∑
b∈B
1
|Γb|
∑
a∈Γb
pρ(b | a)pρ(a). (8)
We then define the initial uncertainty as the min-entropy of
A : B. Thus we have the following definition.
Definition 4: Let A be a random variable and B the adver-
sary’s additional information about A. Then the initial threat
to A given B, denoted H∞(A : B), is defined as
H∞(A : B) = log
( 1
V(A : B)
)
. (9)
Example 3: Suppose that A is uniformly distributed over
{0, 1, 2, 3} and the adversary’s extra information is about the
parity of A. Assume that the a priori distribution of A is
publicly-known, i.e. ∀a ∈ A, pβ(a) = pρ(a). Assume also
that the adversary believes that her extra info is accurate, that
is she assumes the following correlation:
pβ(b | a) b0 b1
a0 1 0
a1 0 1
a2 1 0
a3 0 1
pρ(b | a) pρ1 pρ2 pρ3 pρ4
V(A : B) 0.49 0.02 0.50 0
H∞(A : B) 1.03 5.56 1 +∞
pρ1(b | a) b0 b1
a0 0.98 0.02
a1 0.02 0.98
a2 0.98 0.02
a3 0.02 0.98
pρ2(b | a) b0 b1
a0 0.03 0.97
a1 0.98 0.02
a2 0.04 0.96
a3 0.94 0.08
pρ3(b | a) b0 b1
a0 1 0
a1 0 1
a2 1 0
a3 0 1
pρ4(b | a) b0 b1
a0 0 1
a1 1 0
a2 0 1
a3 1 0
TABLE II
Initial uncertainty in presence of belief
Then Γ0 = {0, 2} and Γ1 = {1, 3}. Thus
V(A : B) =
∑
b∈B
1
|Γb|
∑
a∈Γb
pρ(b | a)pρ(a)
=
∑
b∈{0,1}
1
|Γb|
∑
a∈Γb
1
4
pρ(b | a)
=
1
4
[ 1
2
∑
a∈Γ0
pρ(b0 | a)
+
1
2
∑
a∈Γ1
pρ(b1 | a)
]
=
1
8
[
pρ(b0 | a0) + pρ(b0 | a2)
+ pρ(b1 | a1) + pρ(b1 | a3)
]
.
Table II summarizes the initial uncertainty about A when
the real correlation between the high level input and the
extra observables is pρ1(b | a), pρ2(b | a), pρ3(b | a), and
pρ4(b | a) respectively. The correlation pρ1(b | a) means that
the adversary’s extra information is slightly noisy: when the
high input is an even (resp. odd) number, the extra observable
is usually (with probability 0.98) even (resp. odd). But with
a small probability the adversary is wrong as the parity
is reversed. The contrary holds for the second correlation
pρ2(b | a), that is the correlation is highly noisy. The third
correlation is not a noisy one and coincide with the adversary’s
assumed one: the adversary’s belief is therefore 100% accurate
since we assumed that the actual a priori distribution of A is
publicly-known. Finally, the last correlation pρ4(b | a) always
fools the attacker by reverting the parity. Note that in this last
case the adversary’s initial uncertainty is infinite. This means
that it is impossible for her to guess the value of the secret in
one try when her initial belief is 100% inaccurate.
More generally, let Beliefs(A, B) denote the set of adver-
sary’s beliefs about A according to the extra information B,
and let Beliefs⊥(A, B) be the set of totally inaccurate beliefs,
Beliefs⊥(A, B) =
{ (
pβ(a), pβ(b | a)
)
∈ Beliefs(A, B) |
∀b ∈ B, a ∈ Γb implies pρ(a | b) = 0
}
Then the following result holds.
Proposition 2: Let A be a random variable and B the
adversary’s extra information about A. Let (pβ(a), pβ(b | a)) be
the adversary’s belief, then
(
pβ(a), pβ(b | a)
)
∈ Beliefs⊥(A, B) implies H∞(A : B) = +∞.
Proof: Direct consequence of Proposition 1 and Defini-
tion 4.
In order to avoid such infinite values when computing
the reduction of uncertainty, we shall exclude 100% always
inaccurate beliefs. Thus we define admissible beliefs up to a
positive number ǫ so that we can approximate 100% always
inaccurate beliefs by making ǫ as close to zero as possible.
Definition 5: An adversary’s initial belief is ǫ-admissible
(0 < ǫ ≤ 1) if the following holds.
∀b ∈ B, a ∈ Γb implies pρ(a | b) ≥ ǫ.
Beliefsǫ(A, B) denotes the set of ǫ-admissible beliefs.
Note that in the above definition, ǫ is a lower bound on the
probability that the adversary’s guess is correct. Note also that
if a belief is ǫ-admissible then it is also ǫ′-admissible for all
ǫ′ ≤ ǫ. Thus Beliefsǫ(A, B) ⊆ Beliefsǫ′ (A, B).
Next we show that, contrary to information, belief may ac-
tually hurt. Indeed, in the above example since A is uniformly
(and publicly) distributed over {0, 1, 2, 3} then H∞(A) = 2.
Hence H∞(A) > H∞(A : B) when ρ ∈ {ρ1, ρ3} and H∞(A) <
H∞(A : B) when ρ ∈ {ρ2, ρ4}. In particular, the following two
results hold.
Lemma 1: If ∀b ∈ B, a ∈ Γb implies pρ(b | a) ≤
1
|B|
then
H∞(A) ≤ H∞(A : B)
Proof:
V(A : B) =
∑
b∈B
1
|Γb|
∑
a∈Γb
pρ(b | a)pρ(a)
≤
∑
b∈B
1
|Γb|
∑
a∈Γb
1
|B|
pρ(a)
≤
∑
b∈B
1
|Γb|
∑
a∈Γb
1
|B|
max
a∈A
pρ(a)
≤
∑
b∈B
1
|Γb|
|Γb|
|B|
max
a∈A
pρ(a)
≤
1
|B|
∑
b∈B
V(A)
≤
|B| V(A)
|B|
= V(A).
Hence H∞(A) ≤ H∞(A : B).
The next result states that a 100% accurate belief is infor-
mation and hence may only reduce the uncertainty about A.
Lemma 2: If ∀b ∈ B, a ∈ Γb implies that pρ(b | a) =
maxa′∈A pρ(a
′ | b), then
H∞(A : B) = H∞(A|B) ≤ H∞(A).
Proof:
V(A : B) =
∑
b∈B
pρ(b)V(A : b)
=
∑
b∈B
pρ(b)
( 1
|Γb|
∑
a∈Γb
pρ(a | b)
)
=
∑
b∈B
pρ(b)
( 1
|Γb|
∑
a∈Γb
max
a′∈A
pρ(a
′ | b)
)
=
∑
b∈B
pρ(b)
( 1
|Γb|
∑
a∈Γb
V(A | b)
)
=
∑
b∈B
pρ(b)
( 1
|Γb|
|Γb| V(A | b)
)
=
∑
b∈B
pρ(b)V(A | b)
= V(A | B)
Hence H∞(A : B) = H∞(A|B) ≤ H∞(A).
We conclude this subsection by establishing both a lower
and an upper bounds of our initial uncertainty in term of min-
entropy. The following auxiliary definitions and results serve
this purpose.
Definition 6: An adversary’s initial belief is (at least) ω-
accurate (0 < ω ≤ 1), denoted
(
pβω (a), pβω (b | a)
)
if the
following holds.
∀b ∈ B,
1
|Γb|
∑
a∈Γb
pρ(a | b) ≥ ω · V(A | b).
In other words, an adversary’s belief is ω-accurate if the
belief-vulnerability of A is never off by more than a factor
ω from the real vulnerability of A given the additional infor-
mation. Similarly, we say that an adversary’s belief is (ω)-
accurate if it is exactly ω-accurate, i.e.,
∀b ∈ B,
1
|Γb|
∑
a∈Γb
pρ(a | b) = ω · V(A | b).
Fixed the actual probabilities pρ(a) and pρ(b | a), let us
consider the partial order ≪ on Beliefs(A, B), such that(
pβ(a), pβ(b | a)
)
≪
(
p′
β
(a), p′
β
(b | a)
)
if and only if
∀b ∈ B,
1
|Γb|
∑
a∈Γb
pρ(a | b) ≤
1
|Γ′
b
|
∑
a∈Γ′
b
pρ(a | b).
Then the following lemma states that (pβ1 (a), pβ1 (b | a)) is an
upper bound on Beliefs(A, B).
Lemma 3: For all
(
pβ(a), pβ(b | a)
)
in Beliefs(A, B) we
have
(
pβ(a), pβ(b | a)
)
≪
(
pβ1 (a), pβ1 (b | a)
)
.
Proof: Follows easily from the definitions of ≪ and(
pβ1 (a), pβ1 (b | a)
)
.
We now show that the uncertainty based on belief-
vulnerability decreases when the accuracy of the adversary’s
belief increase.
Lemma 4:
(
pβ(a), pβ(b | a)
)
≪
(
p′
β
(a), p′
β
(b | a)
)
implies
H∞(A : B) ≥ H∞(A : B
′).
Proof:
(
pβ(a), pβ(b | a)
)
≪
(
p′β(a), p
′
β(b | a)
)
m
∀b ∈ B,
1
|Γb|
∑
a∈Γb
pρ(a | b) ≤
1
|Γ′
b
|
∑
a∈Γ′
b
pρ(a | b)
m
∀b ∈ B, pρ(b)
1
|Γb|
∑
a∈Γb
pρ(a | b) ≤ pρ(b)
1
|Γ′
b
|
∑
a∈Γ′
b
pρ(a | b)
m∑
b∈B
pρ(b)
1
|Γb|
∑
a∈Γb
pρ(a | b) ≤
∑
b∈B
pρ(b)
1
|Γ′
b
|
∑
a∈Γ′
b
pρ(a | b)
m
V(A : B) ≤ V(A : B′).
Hence H∞(A : B) ≥ H∞(A : B
′).
Now we show that a 1-accurate belief is also 100% accurate.
Lemma 5: An adversary’s belief is 1-accurate if and only
if
∀b ∈ B, ∀a ∈ Γb, pρ(a | b) = max
a′∈A
pρ(a
′ | b).
Proof: An adversary’s belief is 1-accurate if and only if
∀b ∈ B,
1
|Γb|
∑
a∈Γb
pρ(a | b) ≥ 1 ·max
a′∈A
pρ(a
′ | b). (10)
But
1
|Γb|
∑
a∈Γb
pρ(a | b) ≤ 1 ·max
a′∈A
pρ(a
′ | b)
since
∀b ∈ B, ∀a ∈ Γb, pρ(a | b) ≤ max
a′∈A
pρ(a
′ | b).
Therefore (10) is equivalent to
∀b ∈ B,
1
|Γb|
∑
a∈Γb
pρ(a | b) = 1 ·max
a′∈A
pρ(a
′ | b) (11)
which itself is equivalent to
∀b ∈ B, ∀a ∈ Γb, pρ(a | b) = max
a′∈A
pρ(a
′ | b).
Indeed, if there exists ai in Γb such that pρ(ai | b) <
maxa′∈A pρ(a
′ | b) there is a j in Γb such that pρ(a j | b) >
maxa′∈A pρ(a
′ | b) in order for (11) to holds; but this is im-
possible.
The next result shows that an ω-accurate belief impacts the
vulnerability of A in presence of extra information by a factor
at least ω.
Lemma 6: If the adversary’s initial belief is ω-accurate then
H∞(A : B) ≤ ω · H∞(A | B)
Proof: By definition we have:
V(A : B) =
∑
b∈B
pρ(b)V(A : b)
=
∑
b∈B
pρ(b)
( 1
|Γb|
∑
a∈Γb
pρ(a | b)
)
(by hypotheses)
≥
∑
b∈B
pρ(b)
(
ω · V(A | b)
)
≥ ω ·
∑
b∈B
pρ(b)V(A | b)
≥ ω · V(A | b).
We can then establish our bounds on the initial uncertainty
as follows.
Theorem 1: Let A be a random variable and B be the
additional information about A. Then
H∞(A | B) ≤ H∞(A : B) ≤ H∞(A | B) + log
(1
ζ
)
,
where ζ = minb∈B
( 1
|Γb |
∑
a∈Γb
pρ(a | b)
)
/V(A | b).
Note that ζ in the above theorem is strictly greater than
zero since we consider admissible beliefs for some positive ǫ.
Hence the upper bound is well defined.
Proof: From Lemma 10, Lemma 2, Lemma 3 and
Lemma 4 we have
H∞(A | B) ≤ H∞(A : B).
The second part of the inequality follows from Lemma 6 and
from the fact that the adversary’s belief is ζ-accurate.
Finally, we show that when A is uniformly distributed, we
can obtain a better upper bound. We begin by recalling a result
proven in [35].
Lemma 7: If A is uniformly distributed and the program is
deterministic then H∞(A |O) = log
(
|A| / |O|
)
.
Thus we have the following corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1: If A is uniformly distributed and the actual
correlation pρ(b | a) is deterministic then
log
( |A|
|B|
)
≤ H∞(A : B) ≤ log
( |A|
|B|
)
+ log
(1
ζ
)
,
where ζ is defined as in the above theorem.
B. A posteriori belief-vulnerability
We now define our belief-vulnerability conditioned to the
low observations of the adversary. Note that in this case, the
adversary’s low observations could help her sort out inaccurate
beliefs. Indeed, if an observation o contradicts her initial belief
about extra information b, that is there is no high input a in Γb
such that pρ(o | a) > 0, then to try values in Γb is pointless. A
belief b is compatible (from the adversary’s point of view) to
an observation o, denoted b⋄o, if there exists a in Γb such that
pρ(o | a) > 0. For instance, if the adversary initially believes
that A is an odd number while observing a low output o of the
program which is only possible for even numbers high inputs,
then her belief and her observation are incompatible. Let o and
b be the adversary’s observation and initial belief respectively.
She will then only try values a in Γb for which pρ(o | a) > 0 if
her belief and observation are compatible. Otherwise, as the
evidence contradicts her belief, she will throw it away and
only use the observation.
Now let Γb,o denote the set possible adversary’s choices
according to both her belief and her low observation. Then
Γb,o =
{
argmaxa∈A pβ(a | b, o) if b ⋄ o,
argmaxa∈A pρ(a | o) otherwise.
Then we define the a posteriori belief-vulnerability as follows.
Definition 7: Let A be the high input of a program, O its
low output and B the adversary’s initial belief about A. Then
the belief-vulnerability of A given O, denoted V(A |O : B), is
defined as
V(A |O : B) =
∑
o∈O
∑
b∈B
pρ(b, o)V(A | o : b), (12)
where V(A | o : b) = 1
|Γb,o |
∑
a∈Γb,o
pρ(a | o, b).
We now show how to compute V(A |O : B) under the
assumption that the extra information B and the low observable
O are actually independent.
V(A |O : B) =
∑
o∈O
pρ(b, o)V(A | o : b)
=
∑
o∈O
∑
b∈B
pρ(b, o)
( 1
|Γb,o|
∑
a∈Γb,o
pρ(a | o, b)
)
=
∑
o∈O
∑
b∈B
1
|Γb,o|
∑
a∈Γb,o
pρ(a | o, b)pρ(b, o)
=
∑
o∈O
∑
b∈B
1
|Γb,o|
∑
a∈Γb,o
pρ(o, b | a)pρ(a)
=
∑
o∈O
∑
b∈B
1
|Γb,o|
∑
a∈Γb,o
pρ(b | a)pρ(o | a)pρ(a)
Thus we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3: Let A be the high input of a program, O its
low output and B the adversary’s extra information about A.
If O and B are independent, then
V(A |O : B) =
∑
o∈O
∑
b∈B
1
|Γb,o|
∑
a∈Γb,o
pρ(b | a)pρ(o | a)pρ(a).
We then define our remaining uncertainty as follows.
Definition 8: Let A be the high input of a program, O
its low output and B the adversary’s initial belief about A.
The remaining uncertainty about A after observing O, denoted
H∞(A |O : B), is defined as
H∞(A |O : B) = log
( 1
V(A |O : B)
)
Example 4: Consider the following program, with A and B
as in Example 3, then O = {0, 1, 2}.
PROG C5:
BEGIN
O := ⌊ log(A + 1) ⌋;
END
Both the program and the adversary’s assumed correlation
are deterministic, it is therefore easy to compute the adver-
sary’s belief conditional matrix pβ(a | o, b) and the associated
possible choices Γo,b. The result is shown in Table III. Thus
under the assumption that B and O are actually independent
we have
V(A |O : B) =
∑
b,o
1
|Γb,o|
∑
a∈Γb,o
pρ(b | a)pρ(o | a)pρ(a)
=
1
4
∑
b,o
1
|Γb,o|
∑
a∈Γb,o
pρ(b | a)pρ(o | a)
=
1
4
[
pρ(b0 | a0)pρ(o0 | a0)
+ pρ(b0 | a2)pρ(o1 | a2)
+ pρ(b0 | a3)pρ(o2 | a3)
+ pρ(b1 | a0)pρ(o0 | a0)
+ pρ(b1 | a1)pρ(o1 | a1)
+ pρ(b1 | a3)pρ(o2 | a3)
]
=
1
4
[
pρ(b0 | a0) + pρ(b0 | a2)
+ pρ(b0 | a3) + pρ(b1 | a0)
+ pρ(b1 | a1) + pρ(b1 | a3)
]
=
1
4
[
(pρ(b0 | a0) + pρ(b1 | a0))
+ (pρ(b0 | a3) + pρ(b1 | a3))
+ pρ(b0 | a2) + pρ(b1 | a1)
]
=
1
4
[
2 + pρ(b0 | a2) + pρ(b1 | a1)
]
.
Hence V(A |O : B) ≥ 1
2
, meaning that the remaining uncer-
tainty H∞(A |O : B) is always less than or equal to 1 regardless
the actual correlation between A and B. Thus PROG C5 leaves
the high value very vulnerable to be guessed. Recall that the
initial uncertainty H∞(A : B) (see Example 3) can be arbitrary
high when the accuracy of the adversary’s belief is very low.
This implies that a deliberate reverting of the parity of the
high value in order to confuse the adversary is of very little
use when the adversary can see the output of PROG C5. Indeed,
even if her initial belief is wrong, the observation allows her
to correct it. Table IV summarises the remaining uncertainty
for PROG C5 when the actual correlation is ρ1, ρ2 and ρ3.
We now establish both a lower bound and upper bound
to our remaining uncertainty. To this end, we establish some
auxiliary results.
We first extend the notion of initial belief’s accuracy and
the partial order ≪ to the adversary’s post-beliefs as follows.
An adversary’s post-belief is (at least) ω-accurate if
∀o ∈ O, ∀b ∈ B,
1
|Γb,o|
∑
a∈Γb,o
pρ(a | o, b) ≥ ω · V(A | o, b).
Let ≪O denote the partial order on Beliefs induced by the ob-
servations O such that
(
pβ(a), pβ(b | a)
)
≪O
(
p′
β
(a), p′
β
(b | a)
)
pβ(a | o, b) a0 a1 a2 aa Γbk ,o j
b0, o0 1 0 0 0 {a0}
b0, o1 0 0 1 0 {a2}
b0, o2 0 0 0 1 {a3}
b1, o0 1 0 0 0 {a0}
b1, o1 0 1 0 0 {a1}
b1, o2 0 0 0 1 {a3}
TABLE III
The adversary’s choices
pρ(b | a) pρ1 pρ2 pρ3
V(A : B) 0.99 0.515 1
H∞(A : B) 0.0145 0.957 0
TABLE IV
Remaining uncertainty in presence of belief
if and only if ∀o ∈ O, ∀b ∈ B,
1
|Γb,o|
∑
a∈Γb,o
pρ(a | o, b) ≤
1
|Γ′
b,o
|
∑
a∈Γ′
b,o
pρ(a | o, b).
As in the previous subsection, we can show that a 1-accurate
post-belief is an information and that the remaining uncertainty
is a decreasing function of the accuracy of the adversary post-
belief.
Lemma 8: Let A be the high input of a program, O its
low output and B be an additional information about A. If the
adversary’s post-belief is 1-accurate then
H∞(A |O : B) = H∞(A | B,O).
Lemma 9:
(
pβ(a), pβ(b | a)
)
≪O
(
p′
β
(a), p′
β
(b | a)
)
implies
H∞(A |O : B) ≥ H∞(A |O : B
′).
We then establish the following bounds for the belief-
vulnerability based remaining uncertainty.
Theorem 2: Let A be a random variable, B be the additional
information about A and O be the low output of the program.
Then
H∞(A |O, B) ≤ H∞(A|O : B) ≤ H∞(A |O, B) + log
(1
η
)
,
where η = mino∈O, b∈B
(
1
|Γo,b |
∑
a∈Γo,b
pρ(a | o, )
)
/V(A | o, b).
Finally we have the following corollary of Theorem 2.
Corollary 2: If A is uniformly distributed and both the
protocol and the actual correlation between A and B are
deterministic then
log
( |A|
|O| · |B|
)
≤ H∞(A |O : B) ≤ log
( |A|
|O| · |B|
)
+ log
(1
η
)
.
We conclude this section by showing that in case of belief’s
absence (i.e., the initial knowledge of the adversary is reduce
to trivial information) then our definitions are equivalent to
the vulnerability-based definitions of Smith.
Theorem 3: The following statements are equivalent.
1) |B| = 1 and the a priori probability of A is publicly-
known.
2) For each adversary’s initial belief
(
pρ(a), pρ(b | a)
)
in
Beliefs(A, B) and for each program pρ(o | a) we have
V(A : B) = V(A) and V(A |O : B) = V(A |O).
3) For each adversary’s initial belief
(
pρ(a), pρ(b | a)
)
in
Beliefs(A, B) and for each program pρ(o | a) we have
H∞(A | B) = H∞(A) and H∞(A |O : B) = H∞(A |O).
Proof: (1)⇒ (2): |B| = 1 implies that B is a constant.
Hence B is independent of both A and O. Furthermore, the
only possible adversary’s belief, which is the publicly-known
a priori distribution of A, is 1-accurate. Thus V(A : B) =
V(A | B). But V(A | B) = V(A) since A and B are independent.
Similarly, V(A |O : B) = V(A |O).
(2)⇒ (1): (By contradiction). Assume that (2) holds and
|B| > 1 or the adversary does not know the a priori distribution
of A. Let first consider the case |B| > 1. Then we can
create an adversary’s belief which is exactly ω-accurate for
any 0 < ω < 1. Thus for such belief we have V(A : B) =
ω · V(A | B). Therefore if we choose ω , V(A)/V(A | B), then
V(A : B) , V(A). Hence, it contradicts our initial hypotheses
that (2) holds.
Now assume that |B| = 1 but the adversary does not know
the a priori distribution of A. Again B is a constant and thus
irrelevant. If A is not uniformly distributed then it is easy
to construct an adversary’s assumed a priori distribution of
A such that V(A : B) , V(A | B) = V(A). If however A
is uniformly distributed then we can still create a program
such that V(A |O : B) , V(A |O, B) = V(A |O). Again, this
contradicts our initial hypotheses that (2) holds.
Finally, the equivalence (2)⇔ (3) follows because functions
g(x) = − log(x) and g′(x) = 2−x are strictly monotone.
V. On the Applicability of the Belief-vulnerability
Approach
The previous section establishes the reasonableness of our
definitions in terms of their theoretical properties. Now we
show the utility of our approach by applying it to various
threat scenarios and comparing the results to the previous
approaches.
We proceed now to the analysis of the programs presented in
this paper, and compare the results with previous approaches.
Each of the programs is analysed under the following hypoth-
esis.
• The high input A is uniform and publicly-known. Thus
∀a ∈ A pρ(a) = pβ(a) =
1
|A|
.
• The adversary believes that her extra info is accurate, that
is she assumes the correlation shown in Table V. Thus
Γ0 = {0, 2} and Γ1 = {1, 3}.
• The real correlation between A and B is of the form of
the matrix shown in Table V. It is easy to see that the
adversary’s initial belief is therefore ω-accurate.
• B and O are independent.
pβ(b | a) b0 b1
a0 1 0
a1 0 1
a2 1 0
a3 0 1
pρ(b | a) b0 b1
a0
ω
1+ω
1
1+ω
a1
1
1+ω
ω
1+ω
a2
ω
1+ω
1
1+ω
a3
1
1+ω
ω
1+ω
TABLE V
Correlation matrices
We denote by IUx the initial uncertainty computed using
approach x ∈ {c, v, bv} where c, v and bv denote the consensus,
vulnerability and belief-vulnerability approaches respectively.
Ditto for RUx and ILx.
We begin by PROG C1 of Example 1. Since A is uniformly
distributed then IUc = IUv = log |A| = 2. Furthermore,
RUv = log
(
|A| / |O|
)
= log 4
2
= 1 = RUc since PROG C1
is deterministic. Thus, when we do not take into account
the attacker’s belief, then ILc = ILv = 1. Now let consider
the uniformly ω-accurate attacker’s belief. Then from the
calculation in Example 3 we have IUbv = − log
( ω
2(1+ω)
)
. And
from Proposition 3, we get RUbv = − log
( ω
1+ω
)
. Therefore for
all ω, ILbv = 1. Thus, the adversary’s initial knowledge about
the parity of A does not affect the quantity of information
leaked by PROG C1. However, the real question is not how
much information is leaked by this program, but what the
remaining uncertainty represents in term of security threat to
Fig. 1. Information flow of PROG C1
Fig. 2. Information flow of PROG C5
the high input. Even though the adversary’s belief does not
affect the quantity of information leaked, it dramatically affects
both the initial and remaining uncertainty. Indeed, as illustrated
by Figure 1, both IUbv and RUbv tend toward infinity as ω
tends toward zero. On the other hand, IUbv and RUbv tend
toward two and one, respectively, as ω tends toward one. In
other words inaccurate beliefs strengthen the security of the
program (by confusing the adversary), whilst accurate beliefs
may weaken it. Thus, a deliberate randomization of the parity
of the high input in order to confuse the adversary is a good
strategy to strengthen the security of this program.
We continue our analysis with PROG C5 of Example 4
which is a slight modification of PROG C1. Again IUc =
IUv = log |A| = 2 and IUbv = − log
( ω
2(1+ω)
)
. For the
remaining uncertainty we have RUc = 0.585, RUv = 0.415
and RUbv = − log
( 2ω+1
2(1+ω)
)
. Therefore, ILc = 1.415, ILv = 1.585
and ILbv = log
( 2ω+1
ω
)
. The information flow ascribed by our
approach to this program is illustrated by Figure 2. Unlike
PROG C1, the information leakage of this program can be
arbitrary high when the inaccuracy of the adversary’s belief is
high whilst its remaining uncertainty RUbv remains very low
even for inaccurate beliefs. As already noticed in Example 4,
this program leaves A highly vulnerable of being guessed and
a deliberate padding of A in order to confuse the adversary
is of little help. Note however that RUbv tends toward one,
which is higher than both RUc and RUv, as ω tends toward
zero. It means that highly inaccurate beliefs slightly strengthen
the security of PROG C5.
We proceed with the probabilistic program PROG C2 (see
Example 1). Again IUc = IUv = log |A| = 2 and IUbv =
− log
( ω
2(1+ω)
)
. For the remaining uncertainty, we have RUv = 1,
RUc =
1
4
(
3 log 3 − log
[
(1 − λ)(1−λ)λλ
] )
and RUbv = − log
( 1
4
+
ω
ω+1
[ 1
4
+ 1
4
max(λ, 1 − λ)
] )
. The information flow ascribed by
the consensus definitions is illustrated in Figure 3 and those
of the belief-vulnerability approach in Figures 4 and 5. We
first note that in the case of belief’s absence, our approach –
which coincides with the vulnerability one– ascribes the same
information flow quantities to both PROG C2 and PROG C1,
even though they seem to present rather different threats.1 The
reason is simply that after her low observation, the adversary
needs on average 21 tries to guess the value of A for both
programs. We also note that the randomisation parameter λ of
PROG C2 has no effect on the vulnerability approach, and has
only a little one on ours when the accuracy of the adversary’s
beliefs tends to 1 and λ to 1
2
. This is due to the fact that these
metrics focus on the single probability that brings greatest risk
and values 0 and 2 of A play symmetric roles with respect
to λ. Finally, comparing Figures 4 and 5 to Figure 1, our
approach allows us to assert that the security performance of
PROG C1 is better than those of PROG C2, except for highly
accurate beliefs. Indeed, the remaining uncertainty of PROG C2
is always less than or equal to 2 whilst those of PROG C1 can
be arbitrary high for highly inaccurate beliefs. In fact, we have
the following result relating the security performance of these
1See the discussion on the last paragraph of page 298 of [34].
Fig. 3. Shannon entropy-based information flow of PROG C2
programs, the randomisation parameter λ, and the accuracy of
the adversary’s beliefs.
Proposition 4: The security performance of PROG C1 is
better than those of PROG C2 if and only if the randomisation
parameter λ of PROG C2 and the accuracy of the adversary’s
beliefs ω satisfy the following relation.
ω ≤
1
3 −max(λ, 1 − λ)
The few elementary examples above illustrate the applica-
bility of our metric to various threats scenarios. In particular,
when it is unavoidable for the attacker to initially have access
to some (potentially inaccurate) information about the high
input, our approach allows to establish the adversary’s beliefs
accuracy limit that is tolerable given a specific program. For
instance, adversary’s beliefs which are less than or equal to
50% accurate are tolerable for PROG C1, since they happen
to confuse the adversary instead of helping her. Furthermore,
given a collection of programs with the same security ob-
jective, we can design a more complex program that adapts
dynamically to the context of the adversary, when the accuracy
of her beliefs changes. For example, proposition 4 tells us
that it is more secure to use PROG C1 that PROG C2 in a
context where one can assume that the accuracy of the initial
information of the adversary is less than two-fifth; on the other
hand, the contrary holds for higher accurate beliefs.
VI. Conclusion
This paper presents a new approach to quantitative informa-
tion flow that incorporates the attacker’s beliefs in the model
on Re´neyi min entropy. We investigate the impact of such
adversary’s extra knowledge on the security of the secret infor-
mation. Our analyses reveals that inaccurate extra information
tend to confuse the adversary by increasing her uncertainty
about the hidden secret while accurate information may in-
crease dramatically its vulnerability. We showed the strength of
our definitions both in terms of their theoretical properties and
their utility by applying them to various threat scenarios and
comparing the results to the previous approaches. Our model
allows to identify the levels of accuracy for the adversary’s
Fig. 4. RUbv of PROG C2
Fig. 5. ILbv of PROG C2
beliefs which are compatible with the security of a given
program or protocol.
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